Changes in 4.9.176 x86/MCE: Save microcode revision in machine check records x86/cpufeatures: Hide AMD-specific speculation flags x86/bugs: Add AMD's variant of SSB_NO x86/bugs: Add AMD's SPEC_CTRL MSR usage x86/bugs: Switch the selection of mitigation from CPU vendor to CPU features x86/bugs: Fix the AMD SSBD usage of the SPEC_CTRL MSR x86/microcode/intel: Add a helper which gives the microcode revision x86/microcode/intel: Check microcode revision before updating sibling threads x86/microcode: Make sure boot_cpu_data.microcode is up-to-date x86/microcode: Update the new microcode revision unconditionally x86/mm: Use WRITE_ONCE() when setting PTEs bitops: avoid integer overflow in GENMASK(_ULL) x86/speculation: Simplify the CPU bug detection logic locking/atomics, asm-generic: Move some macros from <linux/bitops.h> to a new <linux/bits.h> file x86/speculation: Remove SPECTRE_V2_IBRS in enum spectre_v2_mitigation x86/cpu: Sanitize FAM6_ATOM naming Documentation/l1tf: Fix small spelling typo x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs x86/speculation/l1tf: Drop the swap storage limit restriction when l1tf=off x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() x86/speculation: Move STIPB/IBPB string conditionals out of cpu_show_common() x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled sched: Add sched_smt_active() x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm() x86/speculation: Split out TIF update x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options kvm: x86: Report STIBP on GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID x86/msr-index: Cleanup bit defines x86/speculation: Consolidate CPU whitelists x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Add BUG_MSBDS_ONLY x86/kvm: Expose X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR to guests x86/speculation/mds: Add mds_clear_cpu_buffers() x86/speculation/mds: Clear CPU buffers on exit to user x86/kvm/vmx: Add MDS protection when L1D Flush is not active x86/speculation/mds: Conditionally clear CPU buffers on idle entry x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation control for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Add sysfs reporting for MDS x86/speculation/mds: Add mitigation mode VMWERV Documentation: Move L1TF to separate directory Documentation: Add MDS vulnerability documentation x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation decisions x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message x86/speculation/mds: Fix comment x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option x86/speculation: Support 'mitigations=' cmdline option x86/speculation/mds: Add 'mitigations=' support for MDS x86/mds: Add MDSUM variant to the MDS documentation Documentation: Correct the possible MDS sysfs values x86/speculation/mds: Fix documentation typo x86: stop exporting msr-index.h to userland x86/cpu/bugs: Use __initconst for 'const' init data Linux 4.9.176 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
217 lines
7.0 KiB
C
217 lines
7.0 KiB
C
#ifndef _LINUX_PRCTL_H
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#define _LINUX_PRCTL_H
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#include <linux/types.h>
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/* Values to pass as first argument to prctl() */
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#define PR_SET_PDEATHSIG 1 /* Second arg is a signal */
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#define PR_GET_PDEATHSIG 2 /* Second arg is a ptr to return the signal */
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/* Get/set current->mm->dumpable */
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#define PR_GET_DUMPABLE 3
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#define PR_SET_DUMPABLE 4
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/* Get/set unaligned access control bits (if meaningful) */
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#define PR_GET_UNALIGN 5
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#define PR_SET_UNALIGN 6
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# define PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT 1 /* silently fix up unaligned user accesses */
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# define PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS 2 /* generate SIGBUS on unaligned user access */
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/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from
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* uid 0 (as per security/commoncap.c) */
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#define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS 7
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#define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS 8
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/* Get/set floating-point emulation control bits (if meaningful) */
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#define PR_GET_FPEMU 9
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#define PR_SET_FPEMU 10
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# define PR_FPEMU_NOPRINT 1 /* silently emulate fp operations accesses */
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# define PR_FPEMU_SIGFPE 2 /* don't emulate fp operations, send SIGFPE instead */
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/* Get/set floating-point exception mode (if meaningful) */
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#define PR_GET_FPEXC 11
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#define PR_SET_FPEXC 12
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# define PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE 0x80 /* Use FPEXC for FP exception enables */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_DIV 0x010000 /* floating point divide by zero */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_OVF 0x020000 /* floating point overflow */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_UND 0x040000 /* floating point underflow */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_RES 0x080000 /* floating point inexact result */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_INV 0x100000 /* floating point invalid operation */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_DISABLED 0 /* FP exceptions disabled */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_NONRECOV 1 /* async non-recoverable exc. mode */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_ASYNC 2 /* async recoverable exception mode */
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# define PR_FP_EXC_PRECISE 3 /* precise exception mode */
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/* Get/set whether we use statistical process timing or accurate timestamp
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* based process timing */
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#define PR_GET_TIMING 13
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#define PR_SET_TIMING 14
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# define PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL 0 /* Normal, traditional,
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statistical process timing */
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# define PR_TIMING_TIMESTAMP 1 /* Accurate timestamp based
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process timing */
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#define PR_SET_NAME 15 /* Set process name */
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#define PR_GET_NAME 16 /* Get process name */
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/* Get/set process endian */
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#define PR_GET_ENDIAN 19
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#define PR_SET_ENDIAN 20
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# define PR_ENDIAN_BIG 0
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# define PR_ENDIAN_LITTLE 1 /* True little endian mode */
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# define PR_ENDIAN_PPC_LITTLE 2 /* "PowerPC" pseudo little endian */
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/* Get/set process seccomp mode */
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#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
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#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22
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/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */
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#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
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#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
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/* Get/set the process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */
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#define PR_GET_TSC 25
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#define PR_SET_TSC 26
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# define PR_TSC_ENABLE 1 /* allow the use of the timestamp counter */
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# define PR_TSC_SIGSEGV 2 /* throw a SIGSEGV instead of reading the TSC */
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/* Get/set securebits (as per security/commoncap.c) */
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#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27
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#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28
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/*
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* Get/set the timerslack as used by poll/select/nanosleep
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* A value of 0 means "use default"
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*/
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#define PR_SET_TIMERSLACK 29
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#define PR_GET_TIMERSLACK 30
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#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE 31
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#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE 32
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/*
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* Set early/late kill mode for hwpoison memory corruption.
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* This influences when the process gets killed on a memory corruption.
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*/
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#define PR_MCE_KILL 33
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# define PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR 0
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# define PR_MCE_KILL_SET 1
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# define PR_MCE_KILL_LATE 0
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# define PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY 1
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# define PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT 2
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#define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34
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/*
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* Tune up process memory map specifics.
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*/
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#define PR_SET_MM 35
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# define PR_SET_MM_START_CODE 1
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# define PR_SET_MM_END_CODE 2
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# define PR_SET_MM_START_DATA 3
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# define PR_SET_MM_END_DATA 4
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# define PR_SET_MM_START_STACK 5
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# define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK 6
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# define PR_SET_MM_BRK 7
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# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
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# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
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# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
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# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
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# define PR_SET_MM_AUXV 12
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# define PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE 13
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# define PR_SET_MM_MAP 14
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# define PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE 15
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/*
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* This structure provides new memory descriptor
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* map which mostly modifies /proc/pid/stat[m]
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* output for a task. This mostly done in a
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* sake of checkpoint/restore functionality.
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*/
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struct prctl_mm_map {
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__u64 start_code; /* code section bounds */
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__u64 end_code;
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__u64 start_data; /* data section bounds */
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__u64 end_data;
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__u64 start_brk; /* heap for brk() syscall */
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__u64 brk;
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__u64 start_stack; /* stack starts at */
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__u64 arg_start; /* command line arguments bounds */
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__u64 arg_end;
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__u64 env_start; /* environment variables bounds */
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__u64 env_end;
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__u64 *auxv; /* auxiliary vector */
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__u32 auxv_size; /* vector size */
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__u32 exe_fd; /* /proc/$pid/exe link file */
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};
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/*
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* Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task.
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* A value of 0 mean "no process".
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*/
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#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
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# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1)
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#define PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 36
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#define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 37
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/*
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* If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e.
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* execve) will either fail or not grant them. This affects suid/sgid,
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* file capabilities, and LSMs.
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*
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* Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid,
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* capset, etc.) will still work. Drop those privileges if you want them gone.
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*
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* Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example,
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* asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result
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* in execve returning -EPERM.
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*
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* See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details.
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*/
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#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
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#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
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#define PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS 40
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#define PR_SET_THP_DISABLE 41
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#define PR_GET_THP_DISABLE 42
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/*
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* Tell the kernel to start/stop helping userspace manage bounds tables.
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*/
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#define PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT 43
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#define PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT 44
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#define PR_SET_FP_MODE 45
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#define PR_GET_FP_MODE 46
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# define PR_FP_MODE_FR (1 << 0) /* 64b FP registers */
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# define PR_FP_MODE_FRE (1 << 1) /* 32b compatibility */
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/* Control the ambient capability set */
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#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
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# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
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# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
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# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
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# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4
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/* Per task speculation control */
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#define PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL 52
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#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53
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/* Speculation control variants */
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# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0
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# define PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH 1
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/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */
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# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0
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# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0)
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# define PR_SPEC_ENABLE (1UL << 1)
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# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE (1UL << 2)
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# define PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE (1UL << 3)
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#define PR_SET_VMA 0x53564d41
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# define PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME 0
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#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
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