Changes in 4.9.324 arm64: entry: Restore tramp_map_kernel ISB ALSA: hda - Add fixup for Dell Latitidue E5430 xen/netback: avoid entering xenvif_rx_next_skb() with an empty rx queue net: sock: tracing: Fix sock_exceed_buf_limit not to dereference stale pointer ARM: 9213/1: Print message about disabled Spectre workarounds only once nilfs2: fix incorrect masking of permission flags for symlinks net: dsa: bcm_sf2: force pause link settings ARM: 9209/1: Spectre-BHB: avoid pr_info() every time a CPU comes out of idle cipso: Fix data-races around sysctl. icmp: Fix data-races around sysctl. ipv4: Fix data-races around sysctl_ip_dynaddr. sfc: fix use after free when disabling sriov sfc: fix kernel panic when creating VF virtio_mmio: Add missing PM calls to freeze/restore virtio_mmio: Restore guest page size on resume cpufreq: pmac32-cpufreq: Fix refcount leak bug net: tipc: fix possible refcount leak in tipc_sk_create() NFC: nxp-nci: don't print header length mismatch on i2c error ASoC: ops: Fix off by one in range control validation ASoC: wm5110: Fix DRE control x86: Clear .brk area at early boot signal handling: don't use BUG_ON() for debugging USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add Belimo device ids usb: dwc3: gadget: Fix event pending check tty: serial: samsung_tty: set dma burst_size to 1 serial: 8250: fix return error code in serial8250_request_std_resource() mm: invalidate hwpoison page cache page in fault path can: m_can: m_can_tx_handler(): fix use after free of skb Linux 4.9.324 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com> Change-Id: Ic45b3811fea105d8a51154c3684045ac3aa8bc01
307 lines
6.9 KiB
C
307 lines
6.9 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/psci.h>
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#include <linux/smp.h>
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#include <asm/cp15.h>
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#include <asm/cputype.h>
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#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
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#include <asm/spectre.h>
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#include <asm/system_misc.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
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#define SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED 1
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static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
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{
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struct arm_smccc_res res;
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arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
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ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
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switch ((int)res.a0) {
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case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
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return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
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case SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED:
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return SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
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default:
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return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
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}
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}
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#else
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static int __maybe_unused spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state(void)
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{
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return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
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}
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
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DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
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extern void cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
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extern void cpu_v7_bpiall_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
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extern void cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
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extern void cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
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static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
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{
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write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
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}
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static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
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{
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write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
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}
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static void __maybe_unused call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void)
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{
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arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
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}
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static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
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{
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arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
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}
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static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
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{
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const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
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int cpu = smp_processor_id();
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if (per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu))
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return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
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switch (method) {
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case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
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per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
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harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
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spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
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break;
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case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU:
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per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
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harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
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spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
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break;
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case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC:
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per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
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call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
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cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
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spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
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break;
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case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC:
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per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
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call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
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cpu_do_switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
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spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
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break;
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}
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if (spectre_v2_method)
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pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
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smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
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return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
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}
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#else
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static unsigned int spectre_v2_install_workaround(unsigned int method)
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{
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pr_info_once("Spectre V2: workarounds disabled by configuration\n");
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return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
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}
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#endif
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static void cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init(void)
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{
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unsigned int state, method = 0;
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switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A8:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A9:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
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state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
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method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL;
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break;
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
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state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
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method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_ICIALLU;
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break;
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default:
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/* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */
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if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM) {
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state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
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break;
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}
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/* fallthrough */
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/* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: {
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struct arm_smccc_res res;
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state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_fw_mitigation_state();
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if (state != SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
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break;
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if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
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break;
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switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
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case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
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arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
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ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
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if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
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break;
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method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_HVC;
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break;
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case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
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arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
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ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
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if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
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break;
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method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_SMC;
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break;
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default:
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state = SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
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state = spectre_v2_install_workaround(method);
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spectre_v2_update_state(state, method);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY
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static int spectre_bhb_method;
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static const char *spectre_bhb_method_name(int method)
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{
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switch (method) {
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case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8:
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return "loop";
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case SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL:
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return "BPIALL";
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default:
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return "unknown";
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}
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}
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static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method)
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{
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if (spectre_bhb_method != method) {
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if (spectre_bhb_method) {
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pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: method disagreement, system vulnerable\n",
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smp_processor_id());
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return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
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}
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if (spectre_bhb_update_vectors(method) == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE)
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return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
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spectre_bhb_method = method;
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pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre BHB: enabling %s workaround for all CPUs\n",
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smp_processor_id(), spectre_bhb_method_name(method));
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}
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return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
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}
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#else
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static int spectre_bhb_install_workaround(int method)
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{
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return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE;
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}
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#endif
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static void cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init(void)
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{
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unsigned int state, method = 0;
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switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72:
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state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
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method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_LOOP8;
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break;
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
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case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
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state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
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method = SPECTRE_V2_METHOD_BPIALL;
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break;
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default:
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state = SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED;
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break;
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}
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if (state == SPECTRE_MITIGATED)
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state = spectre_bhb_install_workaround(method);
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spectre_v2_update_state(state, method);
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}
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static __maybe_unused bool cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
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u32 mask, const char *msg)
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{
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u32 aux_cr;
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asm("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c0, 1" : "=r" (aux_cr));
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if ((aux_cr & mask) != mask) {
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if (!*warned)
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pr_err("CPU%u: %s", smp_processor_id(), msg);
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*warned = true;
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, spectre_warned);
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static bool check_spectre_auxcr(bool *warned, u32 bit)
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{
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return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) &&
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cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(warned, bit,
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"Spectre v2: firmware did not set auxiliary control register IBE bit, system vulnerable\n");
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}
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void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
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{
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if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6)))
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cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
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}
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void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
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{
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if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0)))
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cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
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cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init();
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}
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void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
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{
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cpu_v7_spectre_v2_init();
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cpu_v7_spectre_bhb_init();
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}
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